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NOTES
no especially odious burden is placed on him to state those facts more
fully and completely.
The enforcement of the Aguilar decision will, no doubt, reduce
those arrests made by officers without "probable cause." A form
affidavit will be practically impossible to draw since the facts neces-
sary to issue a valid search warrant will vary radically from case to
case. The net effect of the changes brought by Aguilar is difficult to
forecast. It is a worthwhile attempt to preserve those constitutional
rights basic to our freedoms; but, unfortunately, it is accompanied
by some undesirable ramifications.
CaMille Bruce
Due Process and the Role of the Trial Judge in
Determining the Voluntariness of a Confession -
A New Constitutional Rule
I. DUE PROCESS RESTRICTIONS ON STATE HANDLING OF THE
COERCION ISSUE
Since 19361 the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly in-
voked the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to limit
the state courts' use of involuntary confessions. Due process of law
has been construed not as a rigid exclusionary rule of evidence,' but
as a constitutionally imposed standard of "fairness" required of all
state proceedings.' Although not without criticism,' the fairness test
of due process has provided the rationale for an impressive line of
decisions which has progressively broadened the protection afforded
an accused against a conviction based on an involuntary confession!e
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
'In the past, the Supreme Court's restrictive powers over state court proceedings have
been more limited than in the federal system in which the fifth amendment provides the
authority. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). In a recent case, however, the
Court declared that the fourteenth amendment makes the fifth amendment prohibition
against compulsory self-incrimination applicable to the states. Malloy v, Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964).
aSchwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
'Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97 (1934); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908).
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947), (dissenting opinion of Black, J.)
See also his concurring opinion in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952).
a Bader, Coerced Confessions and the Due Process Clause, 15 Brooklyn L. Rev. 51 (1949);
Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U. S. Supreme Court,
19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35 (1962).
The early cases in which the Supreme Court reversed state findings on the issue of coer-
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During the preceding two decades, rapidly expanding concepts of
fairness have given birth to a number of principles which have been
declared essential to due process if an issue arises as to the voluntari-
ness of a confession.' In Lisenba v. California,' the Court announced
the rule that no conviction may be based upon a coerced confession.
Shortly thereafter, a series of confession cases established the prin-
ciple that if an involuntary confession is admitted in the trial court
a defendant's subsequent conviction must be reversed' even if there
is other evidence sufficient to convict. In recent years an imposing
group of confession cases has explicitly reaffirmed these principles.1
Inevitably, the Court, focusing attention upon procedural depri-
vation of due process," enunciated the defendant's right to a fair
and reliable determination of the issue of voluntariness." It has been
held that this determination must be an objective one, uninfluenced
by irrelevant considerations such as the truth or falsity of the con-
fession." Thus, the manner in which the state courts resolve the
coercion issue became a matter for the Supreme Court to measure
by traditional standards of due process of law."
cion involved physical violence which was clearly coercive. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). More subtle police methods were rebuked in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (accused questioned continuously for thirty-
six hours). Further refinement of the Court's stand against "psychological" coercion was
effected by Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), and Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945).
7See Fairman, Compulsory Self-Incrimination, Fundamental Law in Criminal Prosecu-
tions 59 (Harding ed. 1959); McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Ad-
missibility of Confessions, 24 Texas L. Rev. 239 (1946).
s314 U.S. 219 (1941).
'Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n. 1
(1944).
10 For example, in Malinski v. New York, the Court said, "If [an involuntary confession]
... is introduced at the trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the
evidence apart from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict."
324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
"Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
"I See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 16 (1953); Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedures, 13
U. Chi. L. Rev. 266 (1940).
aHaley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (dissenting opinion of Vinson, C.J., and Bur-
ton, Reed, and Jackson, JJ.). In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1961), Mr.
Justice Frankfurter urged that "a state defendant should have the opportunity to have all
issues which may be determinative of his guilt tried by a judge or a state jury under ap-
propriate state procedures which conform to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment."
" Rogers v. Richmond, note 13 supra; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Malin-
ski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). See
also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 199 (1953) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
" The Court's notion of the scope of its review in confession cases seems to have under-
gone some modification since Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The rule was ac-
cepted very early that only the "uncontradicted facts" available from the record should
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II. STATE PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING
THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARINESS
Most of the states follow one of three procedural patterns in de-
termining the issue of voluntariness." For purposes of identification
these variant procedures have been termed (1) the orthodox rule,
(2) the Massachusetts rule, and (3) the New York rule." Each may
be distinguished by the manner in which responsibility for resolving
the coercion issue is allocated between judge and jury.
Under the orthodox rule, which appears to be followed in at least
twenty states, the trial judge alone resolves all questions of fact
be considered by the Supreme Court in reviewing the trial court's determination of the
coercion issue. Malinski v. New York, note 14 supra. Alongside this rule the Court later
developed the theory that it must look at "the totality of circumstances" that preceded the
confessions to determine if in fact the confession admitted in the trial court was involun-
tary. Fikes v. Alabama 352 U.S. 191 (1957). This theory was applied in Reck v. Pate, 367
U.S. 433 (1961), in which the Court contended that, upon review, "all the circumstances
attendant upon the confession must be taken into account." Id. at 440. In Rogers v. Rich-
mond the Court reversed a state court conviction on the ground that the trial judge's in-
structions had allowed the jury to determine the issue of voluntariness "under an erroneous
standard of constitutional law." 365 U.S. 534, 546 (1961). Here, the Court focused not on
the "uncontradicted facts" nor on the "totality of circumstances," but looked beyond the
facts or circumstances of the case to the standard of due process inhering in the state
court's determination of the issue. See Ritz, supra note 6, at 63.
"6The Supreme Court, in Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896), appeared to
sanction a fourth variation for the federal courts, by which the judge is allowed to follow
the orthodox or the Massachusetts procedure, at his discretion.
17 For a perceptive comparison of these procedures, see Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions:
The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 319-24
(1954). See also 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940) and (Supp. 1953); Annot.
170 A.L.R. 567 (1947); Annot. 85 A.L.R. 870 (1933).
" The Massachusetts and New York rules seem to be modifications of the older orthodox
rule. The present divergence in trial procedures may be partially attributed to the con-
fusion which has generally attended the allocation of functions between judge and jury for
determining fact questions bearing on admissibility. See Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary
Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 392
(1927); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Ques-
tions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1929).
" Alabama: Blackburn v. State, 38 Ala. App. 143, 149, 88 So. 2d 199, 204 (1954).
Colorado: Read v. People, 122 Colo. 308, 318-19, 221 P.2d 1070, 1076 (1950). Connecticut:
State v. McCarthy, 133 Conn. 171, 177, 49 A.2d 594, 597 (1946). Florida: Graham v.
State, 91 So. 2d 662, 663-64 (1956). Illinois: People v. Fox, 319 Ill. 606, 616-19, 150 N.E.
347, 351-52 (1926). Indiana: Caudill v. State, 224 Ind. 531, 532, 69 N.E.2d 549, 552
(1946). Kansas: State v. Seward, 163 Kan. 136, 144-46, 181 P.2d 478, 484-85 (1947).
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. § 422.110 (1960); Bass v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 431,
177 S.W.2d 386, 388 (1944). Louisiana: State v. Kennedy, 232 La. 755, 762-63, 95 So. 2d
301, 303 (1957). Mississippi: Jones v. State, 228 Miss. 458, 474-75, 88 So. 2d 91, 98
(1956). Montana: State v. Rossell, 113 Mont. 457, 466, 127 P.2d 379, 383 (1942). New
Mexico: State v. Armijo, 64 N.M. 431, 434-35, 329 P.2d 785, 787-88 (1958). But see
State v. Armijo, 18 N.M. 262, 268, 135 Pac. 555, 556-57 (1913) (dictum that trial judge
may choose to follow the Massachusetts rule). North Carolina: State v. Outing, 255 N.C.
468, 472, 121 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1961). North Dakota: State v. English, 85 N.W.2d 427,
430 (N.D. 1957). Tennessee: Tines v. State, 203 Tenn. 612, 619, 315"S.W.2d 111, 1.14
(1958). Utah: State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 346-55, 142 P.2d 178, 184-88 (1943).
Vermont: State v. Blair, 118 Vt. 81, 85, 99 A.2d 677, 680 (1953). Virginia: Durrette v.
Commonwealth, 201 Va. 735, 744, 113 S.E.2d 842, 849 (1960). Washington: State v.
Moore, 60 Wash.2d 144, 146-47, 372 P.2d 536, 538 (1962). West Virginia: State v. Vance,
W. Va., 124 S.E.2d 252, 257 (1962).
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and determines the issue of voluntariness in a preliminary hearing."
If he finds the confession to be voluntary it is admitted into evidence
and the jury is not permitted to re-examine the issue.21 However, once
the confession has been admitted as voluntary the jury may consider
all of the evidence surrounding the taking of the confession in de-
termining its credibility and weight.22 If the judge finds the con-
fession to be involuntary, it is completely excluded from the trial.
Under the Massachusetts rule, observed in at least fourteen states,23
20 Most jurisdictions, regardless of the prevailing rule, favor exclusion of the jury during
the preliminary hearing. See, e.g., State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 730, 60 So. 2d 208, 213-14
(1952) (orthodox rule); State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 2, 8, 15 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1944)
(New York rule). See also United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951), in which
the Supreme Court recognized the defendant's right to have the jury excluded from the
preliminary hearing during his testimony on the issue of voluntariness. But see note 28
infra.
21 Professor Wigmore was among the most adamant proponents of the orthodox view:
"The admissibility of the confession . . . is a question for the judge, on elementary prin-
ciples defining the functions of judge and jury." 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
Conceding that "the heresy of leaving the question [of voluntariness] to the jury has made
rapid strides" in this century, Ibid., he sharply reproved that practice:
This is decidedly improper; first, because it makes abject surrender of the
fixed principle that all questions of admissibility are for the judge only; sec-
ondly, because in particular, the confession rules are artificial, based on average
probabilities or possibilities only and do not attempt to measure the ultimate
value of a given confession, and the tribunal which is to weigh all evidence
finally ought not to be artificially hampered by them; thirdly, because the
jury is not familiar enough with them to employ them. Ibid.
2In Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284 (1895), the jury's prerogative as to the
issue of credibility was carefully distinguished from the judge's responsibility under the
orthodox procedure for determining the question of admissibility:
The jury have no authority to reject [confessions] . . . as incompetent. But
the jury are the sole judges of the truth and weight to be given confessions, as
they are of any other fact. In weighing the confessions, the jury must take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding them, and under which they
were made, including those under which the court declared they were volun-
tary. In weighing confessions, the jury necessarily consider those facts upon
which their admissibility, as having been voluntarily made, depends. While
there is no power in the jury to reject the confessions, as being incompetent,
there is no power in the court to control the jury in the weight to be given
to facts. The jury may, therefore, in the exercise of their authority, and within
their province, determine that the confessions are untrue, or not entitled to
any weight, upon the grounds that they were not voluntarily made. Id. at 290.
' Alaska: Smith v. United States, 268 F.2d 416, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1959). Arizona:
State v. Hudson, 89 Ariz. 103, 106, 358 P.2d 332, 333-34 (1960). But see State v. Preis,
89 Ariz. 336, 362 P.2d 660, 661-62 (1961) (conflicts in the evidence for the jury after
judge "reasonably satisfied" confession not coerced); State v. Owen, 94 Ariz. 404, 409, 385
P.2d 700, 703 (1963) (vacated and remanded on authority of the case being noted).
California: People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal. 2d 870 876, 151 P.2d 251, 254 (1944). Delaware:
Wilson v. State, 49 Del. 37, 48, 109 A.2d 381, 387 (1954). Hawaii: Territory v. Young,
37 Hawaii 189, 193 (1945). Idaho: State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 342-43, 65 P.2d
736, 748 (1937). But see State v. Andreason, 44 Idaho 396, 401-02, 257 Pac. 370, 371
(1927) (seems to state orthodox rule). Maine: State v. Robbins, 135 Me. 121, 122, 190
Atl. 630, 631 (1937). Maryland: Parker v. State, 225 Md. 288, 291, 170 A.2d 210, 211
(1961). But see Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 270-71, 52 A.2d 484, 487-88 (1947).
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 N.E. 494, 495 (1885).
Nebraska: Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 97-98, I N.W.2d 323, 328-29 (1944). New
Hampshire: State v. Squires, 48 N.H. 364, 369-70 (1869). New Jersey: State v. Tassiello,
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the judge makes a full determination of the issue in a preliminary
hearing, as under the orthodox rule." If found to be involuntary, the
confession is excluded. If the confession is admitted as being volun-
tary, however, the jury is instructed that it may reconsider the issue
and find the confession involuntary, in which case it must be entirely
disregarded."5
It is the New York rule which has proved most controversial of
the three, compelling the attention of a number of commentators."'
At least fifteen states appear to use this procedure." Under the New
York rule the judge makes a preliminary inquiry into the manner
39 N.J. 282, 291-92, 188 A.2d 406, 411-12 (1963). Oklahoma: Williams v. State, 93
Okla. Crim. 260, 265, 226 P.2d 989, 993 (1951). But see Cornell v. State, 91 Okla. Crim.
175, 183-84, 217 P.2d 528, 532-33 (1950) (seems to state orthodox rule). Rhode Island:
State v. Boswell, 73 R.I. 358, 361, 56 A.2d 196, 198 (1947).
24 Indeed, the similarities in the two procedures are striking. In either case the jury
considers all the facts going to the issue of coercion after the judge has rendered a de-
termination of voluntariness. Compare, however, the jury's right to find the confession
"untrue, or not entitled to any weight" on grounds of involuntariness as discussed in
Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284 (1895), with the jury's duty to "exclude the
confession" if involuntary as seen in Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 N.E.
494, 495 (1885); see note 22 and note 25.
"2 Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 N.E. 494, 495 (1895): "When there
is conflicting testimony, the humane practice .. . is for the judge, if he decides that it is
admissible, to instruct the jury that they may consider all the evidence, and that they
should exclude the confession, if, upon the whole evidence in the case they are satisfied
that it was not the voluntary act of the defendant." Id. at 495.
"See generally Maguire, Evidence of Guilt § 307(3) (1959); Morgan, Some Problems
of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 104-05 (1956); Meltzer, In-
voluntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between judge and Jury, 21 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 317 (1954); Stevens, Confessions and Criminal Procedure-A Proposal, 34 Wash.
L. Rev. 542 (1959).
"
t Arkansas: Monts v. State, 233 Ark. 816, 823, 349 S.W.2d 350, 355 (1961). Georgia:
Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 762-763, 48 S.E.2d 377, 382 (1948). Iowa: State v. Jones,
253 Iowa 829, 834-35, 113 N.W.2d 303, 307 (1962). Michigan: People v. Crow, 304 Mich.
529, 531, 8 N.W.2d 164, 165 (1943). Minnesota: State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15
N.W.2d 585 (1944) (appears to state New York rule but cites authority from jurisdictions
which adhere to Massachusetts rule, as well as authority from New York rule states).
Missouri: State v. Goacher, 376 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. 1964). New York: People v. Doran,
246 N.Y. 409, 416-18, 159 N.E. 379, 381-82 (1927). Ohio: State v. Powell, 105 Ohio
App. 529, 530-31, 148 N.E.2d 230, 231 (1957); Burdge v. State, 53 Ohio St. 512, 516-18,
42 N.E. 594, 595-96 (1895) (judge may follow New York rule or Massachusetts rule, at
his discretion). Oregon: State v. Bodi, 223 Ore. 486, 491, 354 P.2d 831, 833-34 (1960).
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Oister, 201 Pa. Super. 251, 257-58, 191 A.2d 851, 854
(1963), vacated and remanded sub nom. Oister v. Pennsylvania, 378 U.S. 568 (1964).
South Carolina: State v. Bullock, 235 S.C. 356, 366-67, 111 S.E.2d 657, 662 (1959).
South Dakota: State v. Hinz, 78 S.D. 442, 449-50, 103 N.W.2d 656, 660 (1960). Texas:
Harris v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 370 S.W.2d 886, 887 (1963), vacated and remanded
sub now. Harris v. Texas, 378 U.S. 572 (1964); Lopez v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 317, 366
S.W.2d 587 (1963), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lopez v. Texas, 378 U.S. 567 (1964);
Marrufo v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 398, 402, 357 S.W.2d 761, 764 (1962); Odis v. State,
171 Tex. Crim. 107, 109, 345 S.W.2d 529, 530-31 (1961); Newman v. State, 148 Tex.
Crim. 645, 649-50, 187 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (1945); Gipson v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 428,
429, 181 S.W.2d 76, 77 (1944); Cavazos v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 564, 566-67, 160 S.W.2d
260, 261 (1942); Ward v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 444, 449, 158 S.W.2d 516, 518 (1942).
Wisconsin: State v. Bronston, 7 Wis. 2d 627, 638, 97 N.W,2d 504, 511 (1959). Wyoming:
Clay v. State, 15 Wyo. 42, 59, 86 Pac. 17, 19 (1906).
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in which the confession was obtained," but he will make a final
determination of the issue only if there is no reasonable conflict of
factual evidence." If such a conflict is found, the confession is ad-
mitted tentatively and the issue is given to the trial jury to be
resolved alongside other issues in the case."0 The jury is instructed
that it may use the confession if it is found to be voluntary, affording
it credibility and weight as justice requires. If found to be in-
voluntary, it must be completely disregarded and guilt or innocence
determined solely on the basis of the other evidence."
In Stein v. New York"5 the Supreme Court measured the New York
rule by the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.' The Court
attempted to reconcile the New York practice of submitting the
issue of voluntariness to the jury with established principles of due
process. ' In affirming the petitioner's conviction, the majority rea-
soned that the New York procedure produces one of two alternative
results, neither of which is violative of established requisites to due
process: either the jury (1) finds the confession voluntary and law-
fully considers it or (2) finds the confession involuntary and,
pursuant to the court's instructions, dutifully disregards it."s Cer-
tainly not blind to the rule's imperfections," the Court in Stein con-
2' Under New York State procedure the judge is not required to exclude the jury during
the preliminary hearing. It is not entirely clear whether he is allowed to do so. See People
v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E. 112 (1909); People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 85 N.E.
809 (1908). But see note 20 supra.
" Although it is clear that the judge may make a final determination of involuntariness,
there is a lack of uniformity among jurisdictions following the New York rule as to
whether he may make a conclusive finding of voluntariness as well. Compare State v. Scott,
209 S.C. 61, 64-65, 38 S.E.2d 902, 903 (1946), with People v. Pignatoro, 263 N.Y. 229,
240-41, 188 N.E. 720, 724 (1934).
' The court need not resolve the evidence and make a finding; it is required only to
determine that a finding of voluntariness could reasonably be made. E.g., People v. Leyra,
302 N.Y. 353, 364, 98 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1951).
31 See note 44 infra.
12346 U.S. 156 (1953).
" The issue of whether the New York rule is inconsistent with the fourteenth amend-
ment was squarely before the Court for the first time although the Supreme Court had re-
viewed numerous confession cases in which the issue of coercion had been resolved in the
trial court pursuant to the New York rule. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
34346 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1953).351 Id. at 190.
e [T]his procedure does not produce any definite, open and separate decision
of the confession issue. Being cloaked by the general verdict, petitioners do not
know what result they really are attacking here. ...
This method of trying the coercion issue to a jury is not informative as to
its disposition. Sometimes the record permits a guess or inference, but where
other evidence of guilt is strong a reviewing court cannot learn whether the
final result was to receive or to reject the confessions as evidence of guilt.
Perhaps a more serious, practical cause of dissatisfaction is the absence of any
assurance that the confessions did not serve as makeweights in a compromise
verdict, some jurors accepting the confessions to overcome lingering doubts of
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cluded, over an angry dissent,a" that the New York procedure is not
injurious to the standard of fairness required by the fourteenth
amendment. This view went unquestioned by the Supreme Courts
until the stimulus of dissident commentary" and subsequent decisions
reaffirming traditional principles which were cast in doubt by Stein"°
induced the Court to re-examine the issue in Jackson v. Denno."
III. JACKSON V. DENNO
Petitioner, accused of murdering a policeman during a holdup
attempt, under questioning confessed the killing to police detectives
while he was awaiting an emergency operation for gunshot wounds
received at the scene of the robbery. Petitioner had no counsel pres-
ent when the confession was elicited, certain preoperative sedatives
had been administered to him, and he had been denied a glass of
water." His version of the circumstances under which the confession
was obtained differed in several respects from that of police witnesses.
The trial judge, according to well established New York procedure,'
submitted the question of voluntariness to the jury. The jury was
instructed to use the confession if found to be voluntary, affording
it proper credibility and weight. Alternatively, the court charged
that if the confession were found to be involuntary, it must be
completely excluded from consideration and a verdict reached wholly
on the basis of the other evidence."
guilt, others rejecting them but finding their doubts satisfied by other evidence,
and yet others or perhaps all never reaching a separate and definite conclusion as
to the confessions but returning an unanalytical and impressionistic verdict
based on all they had heard. Id. at 177-78.
3 None of the dissenters attacked the Court's assumptions about jury regularity. How-
ever, the issue of whether the New York procedure violates settled principles of due process
would seem to turn on the validity or invalidity of those assumptions. See discussion in
text accompanying note 45 infra.
SSee Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390
(1958).
a" See generally the sources cited in note 26 supra.
'See the cases cited in note 11 supra.
4' 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
" Mr. Justice Black, concurring in part, contended that the conditions under which the
confession was elicited were "inherently coercive." 378 U.S. at 401. See Ashcraft v. Tennes-
see, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
"aThis procedure has persisted unchallenged in New York for over a century. See
People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 416, 159 N.E. 379, 381 (1908) and cases cited therein.
4 Under our law, a confession, even if true and accurate, if involuntary, is not
admissible, and if it is left for the jury to determine whether or not it was
voluntary, its decision is final. If you say it was involuntarily obtained, it goes
out of the case. If you say it was voluntarily made, the weight of it is for
you. So I am submitting to you as a question of fact to determine whether or
not this statement was made by Jackson, or allegedly made by Jackson,
whether it was a voluntary confession, and whether it was true and accurate.
That decision is yours.
Should you decide under the rules that I gave you that it is voluntary,
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In Jackson the Court undertook a more realistic analysis of the
New York rule and its effect upon due process than had been at-
tempted in Stein. The majority maintained that the Court in Stein,
by deducing that only two alternative results may be accomplished
by the New York procedure," overlooked the significance of other
effects which seriously undermine an accused's constitutionally re-
quired protection against the use of coerced confessions. Specifically,
the Court noted that (1) irrelevant considerations may influence the
jury's decision on the issue, (2) the jury may not be able to ignore
a confession it finds to be involuntary, or (3) the issue may not be
resolved at all.
A. Irrelevant Considerations May Influence
The Jury's Decision On The Issue
After all of the evidence has been presented, the jurors' irrelevant
impressions as to the truthfulness of the confession may wrongfully
induce them to determine the issue in favor of voluntariness.6 Point-
ing out that Stein failed to censure the intermingling of the issues of
credibility and voluntariness, the Court attributed this error to the
underlying false assumption of Stein that the inherent untrust-
worthiness of coerced confessions is the only factor which compels
their exclusion." If this assumption were valid, a credible confession
need not be rejected because it is involuntary." But Mr. Justice
White, speaking for the majority in Jackson, went to considerable
lengths to demonstrate that an equally important reason for excluding
such confessions is the desirability of negating the results of abusive
police tactics.4 Accordingly, the majority reasoned that a procedure
true and accurate, you may use it, and give it the weight you feel that you
should give it. If you should decide that it is involuntary, exclude it from the
case. Do not consider it at all. In that event, you must go to the other evidence
in the case to see whether or not the guilt of Jackson was established to your
satisfaction outside of the confession, beyond a reasonable doubt. 378 U.S.
at 375.
45 See note 35 supra.
4 Dissenting in Stein, Mr. Justice Frankfurter set forth the standard adopted by the
Court in the principle case: "This issue must be decided without regard to the confirma-
tion of details in the confession by reliable other evidence. The determination must not be
influenced by an irrelevant feeling of certitude that the accused is guilty of the crime to
which he confessed." Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 200 (1953). See Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) and the other cases cited in note 15 supra.
" The majority in the Stein case had contended that "a coerced confession vitiates a
conviction because such a confession combines the persuasivenss of apparent conclusiveness
with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive evidence." Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
48 Indeed, some courts have held that independent corroborating evidence renders a co-
erced confession trustworthy and admissible. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 856-858 (3d ed.,
1940).
48 It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of
involuntary confessions not only because of the probable unreliability of con-
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in which the coercion issue is resolved by the trial jury,' comprised
of laymen fully cognizant of evidence going to other issues in the
case, does not adequately protect the defendant's right to an objec-
tive, reliable determination of the issue of voluntariness.
B. The jury May Not Ignore A Confession
It Finds To Be Involuntary
Having found the confession to be involuntary, individual jurors
may be incapable of wholly disregarding it.5 The majority ques-
tioned the jury's ability to abide strictly by the court's instructions
and expressed fear that the damaging effect of the inadmissible con-
fession evidence would overcome doubts about the sufficiency of the
other evidence."5 The Court concluded that the resultant threat to
an accused's constitutional right to have an involuntary confession
entirely disregarded is inconsistent with the standard of fairness re-
quired of state proceedings. In this connection, the majority reaffirmed
the principle that reversal must follow if the reviewing court finds
that a coerced confession was admitted at the trial, 3 and-in opposi-
tion to Stein ---declared the rule applicable regardless of the possi-
fessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive, but also because of the
"strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacri-
ficed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a convic-
tion, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will" . . . and because
of "the deep rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the
actual criminals themselves." 378 U.S. at 385-86.
so The Court did not object to a determination of the issue by a separate jury: "Whether
the trial judge, another judge, or another jury, fully resolves the issue of voluntariness is
not a matter of concern here. To this extent we agree with Stein that the States are free
to allocate functions between judge and jury as they see fit." Id. at 391 n. 19.
s" "Under the New York procedure, the fact of a defendant's confession is solidly im-
planted in the jury's mind, for it has not only heard the confession, but it has been in-
structed to consider and judge its voluntariness and is in position to assess whether it is
true or false." Id. at 388.
" In this connection, the majority observed that the efficacy of instructions to disregard
inadmissible evidence has frequently been doubted. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440 (1948) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by in-
structions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.") ; Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1962). But see Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232
(1956); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1951) (cited by Harlan, J. dissenting in Jack-
son, 378 U.S. at 427).
' An impressive number of cases decided after Stein have unequivocally supported the
rule of "automatic reversal." See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority in Stein, attempted to extricate the
New York procedure from the rule's censure: "But here the confessions are put before the
jury only tentatively, subject to its judgment as to voluntariness and with binding instruc-
tions that they be rejected and ignored unless found beyond reasonable doubt to have been
voluntary." Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
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bility that the jury followed instructions to disregard it and based
its conviction wholly on the other evidence."s
C. The Issue May Not Be Resolved At All
Even in Stein the Court professed awareness of the problems cre-
ated by limiting the jury's expression of its conclusions to a general
verdict." Similarly, the majority in Jackson bemoaned the lack of
assurance that the jury had properly resolved the issue of voluntari-
ness and the factual disputes underlying it." Under the New York
rule, the obvious peril is that no definite determination will be made,
in which case individual jurors may use the confession evidence in
varying degrees as they develop their respective conclusions concern-
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused. Indeed, even if the issue is
properly decided, there is no record of the jury's finding to notify the
reviewing court or the convicted petitioner whether the confession
was regarded as voluntary or coerced. Long perplexed by the prob-
lems of fact-finding in its review of confession cases," the Supreme
Court asserted in Jackson that the findings of the tribunal which
determines the issue of coercion must be discernible to the appellate
court before it can properly ascertain if the defendant's constitu-
tional rights have been violated.
Four Justices dissented," vigorously resisting what they considered
to be an attack by the Court on the jury system."0 Mr. Justice Black,
joined by Mr. Justice Clark, saw the majority's charge that a trial
jury's determination of the issue is tainted with unreliability as a
challenge to the fundamental concept in the Constitution that juries
" A refutation of the "other evidence" rule would effectively nullify the jury's efforts
to disregard a coerced confession. In a post-Stein federal habeas corpus proceeding it was
held that "when it appears that a confession was in fact coerced, and when it cannot be
determined that such coerced confession was or was not used by the jury to arrive at their
verdict of guilty, the writ [of habeas corpus] should issue." Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d
83, 90 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956). See Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
See note 36 supra.
5 In jurisdictions following the orthodox rule . . . or those following the
Massachusetts procedure .. . the judge's conclusions are clearly evident from
the record since he either admits the confession into evidence if it is volun-
tary or rejects it if involuntary. Moreover, his findings are expressly stated
or may be ascertainable from the record. In contrast, the New York jury
returns only a general verdict upon the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence. . . . [There is no] indication of how the jury resolved disputes in the
evidence concerning the critical facts underlying the coercion issue. Indeed,
there is nothing to show that these matters were resolved at all, one way or
the other. 378 U.S. at 378-80.
58 See note 15 supra.
5Dissenting were Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart; Mr. Justice Black dissented in
part and concurred in part.
" "Dependence on jury trials is the keystone of our system of criminal justice and I
regret that the Court lends its weight to the destruction of this great safeguard to our lib-
erties." 378 U.S. at 426 (from separate dissenting opinion of Clark, J.).
[Vol. 18
are to be trusted in resolving questions of fact. 1 The possibility that
irrelevant evidence might wrongfully influence the jury to make
use of a coerced confession, he argued, is a possibility "inherent in
any confession fact-finding by human fact-finders-a possibility
present perhaps as much in judges as in jurors." 2 Mr. Justice Harlan
took issue with the Court's second ground for striking down the
New York procedure. Quoting liberally from previous opinions of
the Court, he demonstrated that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected speculation that the jury might have disregarded instructions
as grounds for reversal." Each of the dissenters attacked the majority
decision on the ground that the fourteenth amendment does not
justify federal interference with a state court's procedure for deter-
mining the coercion issue. Mr. Justice Black used the opportunity
to continue his war on the "fairness" test of due process."' Mr. Justice
Harlan contended that the freedom of the states to work out their
individual problems of criminal administration should be abridged
"only where it is demonstrable that their own adjustment of the
competing interests infringes rights fundamental to decent society,"
adding that "the New York rule ... is surely not of that character." 5
These protestations are difficult to justify."6 The Court's refusal
to allow the trial jury to determine the admissibility of a confession
can hardly be termed a departure from traditional concepts of the
jury's function." Issues of competency have always been within the
ambit of the trial judge." Our system of jury trial presupposes that
the judge will apply the exclusionary rules before evidence is sub-
mitted to the jury.6" Indeed, this aspect of the system manifestly
reveals our awareness of the jury's inability to ignore improper evi-
61 Id. at 405.
6
2Id. at 402.
13 Id. at 430-36. But see note 52 supra.
6""My wide difference with the Court is in its apparent holding that it has con-
stitutional power to change trial procedures because of its belief that they
are not fair. There is no constitutional provision which gives this Court any
such lawmaking power. . . . I have repeatedly objected to the use of the Due
Process Clause to give judges such a wide and unbounded power, whether in
cases involving criminal procedure . . . or economic legislation. ... Id. at
407. See also the cases cited in note 5 supra.
6 5 1d. at 439.
" The foregoing are not the only grounds on which the dissenters challenged the majority
decision. However, these protests question the authority of the Court to strike down the
New York procedure, while others, some of which are alluded to below, disparage the
effects of the majority opinion. See e.g. note 79 infra.
67In Bass v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 431, 177 S.W.2d 386, 388 (1944) the
Kentucky Supreme Court construed a state statute which compelled the courts to repudiate
the New York rule and return to the orthodox rule. The statute had been challenged on
grounds that it violated the right of trial by jury. The court held that because the earlier
rule was being returned to, there was no departure from the traditional right to jury trial.
6s3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
669 Wigmore, Evidence § 2550 (3d ed. 1940).
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dence. Moreover, in construing the fourteenth amendment to pro-
scribe the New York rule, the Court has not varied its standard of
due process beyond that of previous decisions in which a state's
handling of the coercion issue has been condemned." Rather, it has
applied established principles to a heretofore neglected area-state
procedure for resolving the issue. In substance, the Supreme Court
has merely acknowledged the fact of jury irregularity and recognized
its injurious effect upon the due process rights of an accused con-
fronted with a pretrial confession."
IV. CONCLUSION
It would seem that the Court in Jackson v. Denno' reached a for-
seeable conclusion. During the past two decades the Supreme Court
has been engaged in perfecting its confession doctrines, continually
broadening the protection afforded an accused." The task has been
to achieve that degree of protection which the fluid "concept of
ordered liberty"" requires. As our standard of due process has de-
veloped, guiding principles have been established to reflect that
standard, and incompatible practices have been discarded."5 It is con-
sistent with the character of this development that the Court should
censure a state trial procedure which deprives an accused of the
constitutional guarantees enumerated by those guiding principles.
Indeed, this decision, by denouncing the erosion of due process
fostered by an inadequate state procedure for determining the issue
of voluntariness, fills a substantial gap in the wall of protection the
Court has been erecting since Brown v. Mississippi.
7
However, although the majority criticized Stein77 for its failure
to consider the practical effects of the trial procedure it sanctioned,
it seems to have fallen into the same error, at least in dicta. The
Court in Jackson acquiesced in the Massachusetts rule, explaining
that "given the integrity of the preliminary proceedings before the
judge," the defendant's rights are fulfilled by the initial determina-
tion, and, if the confession is admitted, a subsequent jury considera-
tion of the issue cannot be damaging.75 The trial court, however,
probably will be inclined to decide close issues in favor of voluntari-
'0 See notes 11 and 15 supra.
71 See also note 37 supra.
72378 U.S. 368 (1964).
73 See note 6 supra.
7 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
71 See Harding, Introduction, Fundamental Law in Criminal Prosecutions I (Harding
ed. 1959).
'a297 U.S. 278 (1936).7 7 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).7'378 U.S. at 378-79.
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ness. It is likely that a trial judge, conscious of the jury's duty to make
a de novo resolution of the admissibility issue, would rather err on the
side of caution than make the final disposition of an issue which alone
may compel the verdict. Moreover, the trial jury, imbued with the in-
adequacies observed by the majority in Jackson, would naturally
be disinclined to traverse a finding which has received the court's
"stamp of approval."" Thus, under the Massachusetts rule, irrelevant
considerations tend to induce both judge and jury to determine the
issue against the accused.
If the Court's opinion had been entirely consistent with its appar-
ent intent to assure realistic protection to the defendant it would
have championed only the orthodox procedure. According to Jackson,
due process requires a preliminary hearing in which the issue of
voluntariness is isolated and determined free of the influence of
irrelevant considerations. Of the three procedures discussed, only the
orthodox practice measures up to that standard under close scrutiny."
Yet it is the Massachusetts rule which is most likely to be adopted
by the states which have followed the New York rule. Their predilec-
tion for a jury consideration of the issue may make a transition to
the orthodox rule seem much too distasteful.'1
In states in which persons have been convicted after a determina-
tion of the issue of voluntariness solely by the convicting jury, such
prisoners apparently will be entitled to a new hearing upon petition
for habeas corpus's -at least on the coercion issue."3 Obviously, then,
", Mr. Justice Black was quick to point out the probability of the judge's finding in-
fluencing the jury:
But it should be obvious that, under the Court's new rule, when a confession
does come before a jury it will have the judge's explicit or implicit stamp of
approval on it. This Court will find it hard to say that the jury will not be
greatly influenced, if not actually coerced, when what the trial judge does is
the same as saying "I am convinced that this confession is voluntary, but,
of course, you may decide otherwise if you like." Id. at 404.
He apparently ascribed this shortcoming to the orthodox procedure as well as the
Massachusetts rule. But under the former practice the judge's decision is binding on the
jury; there is no improper influence, because the jury does not consider the issue of admissi-
bility. It is true that under the orthodox rule the jury may disbelieve the confession on the
ground that it was involuntarily given, and, accordingly, exercise its prerogative to give it
no weight. But in that instance the court's finding of voluntariness would seem to be a
proper indicium of credibility, not-as under the Massachusetts rule--an unwarranted in-
fluence on the jury's de novo resolution of the issue of admissibility.
s See note 79 supra.
'But see note 67 supra; Ky. Rev. Stat. S 422.110 (1960); State v. Moore, 60 Wash.
2d 144, 146-47, 372 P.2d 536, 538 (1962).
82 Though the majority opinion was silent on the matter, the dissent in Jackson as-
sumed that the Court's decision would apply retroactively. Indeed, the constitutional rules
announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) were so applied, and certainly the habeas corpus principles advanced in Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 475 (1964) are consistent with such a view. It
may be said, however, that the point is yet to be conclusively decided.
"o The Court, upon granting the writ of habeas corpus, maintained that the petitioner's
